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Advanced Modular Training

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Καλημέρα, Good morning everyone.

I am very pleased to join you today, to present you some military and security issues of the EU, as well as the role of the EU Military Committee within the security and defence architecture of the EU, looking at the same time forward to a stimulating discussion at the end of my introduction.

The EUMC is composed of the Chiefs of Defence of all 27 EU member states who convene in person every six months or through their Military Representatives in Brussels on a weekly basis, and even more often if it is required.

The Committee was set up by a European Council Decision in January 2001, and it ensures that the voice of the end-users of military capabilities is heard among the EU institutions and that it is incorporated into the decision-making process at all stages and levels of the evolution of the Security and Defence Policy. Specifically MC provides military advice and recommendations to the Political and Security Committee as well as to all relevant decision-making bodies.

The Chairman of the Military Committee also acts as its spokesperson and as such he attends the Council meetings, when decisions with defence implications are to be taken.

He is also the Military Advisor to the High Representative and acts as the primary point of contact for all Operation Commanders.

Having said that, I have to remind you that the current overarching document on the EU security issues is the Global Strategy.

Now, you all know that the EU Global Strategy, drafted and presented by the then HRVP Federica Mogherini, was approved in 2016. The document underlines the need for greater European responsibility in matters of security and defence.

With the Global Strategy an effort was made to raise the level of ambition of the European Union, to become an active and effective player in the overall security environment, facing most of the evolving new threats, challenges, and opportunities. It also defines EU's strategic priorities.

To achieve the objectives of this strategy, a policy is required, known as the Integrated Approach and the EU in order to implement this policy, counts on a large and unique set of tools, from the political to the diplomatic, from the economic to the military. So the military, in this unique EU toolbox is nothing more than a tool that will be used as needed and as appropriate.

In fact, one point must be clear, and it is clear for the EU: there are no military solutions to crises, and yet, no solutions can be found without the proper use of the military tool, from the negotiating phase to the implementation and monitoring of the solutions agreed.

As described in the foreword of the EU GS our wider region has become more unstable and more unsecure. In fact, the situation in 2020 has become more difficult.

A combination of the Butterfly Effect, with problems originating far away reverberating on us, along with the Domino Effect, where crises trigger other crises. Libya, Syria, the Eastern Mediterranean and the Sahel, are only some flashing examples.

In our world of today, we are talking about new threats, hybrid and asymmetric by definition and combined with climate change, which co-exist with the traditional ones that are still there, like

- International terrorism;
- Increased and irregular migration waves and

- Degraded security, human rights violation and civil wars within failed or rogue states and definitely lack of governance.

And to complicate the already chaotic situation, we have revisionist state actors seeking a new role or dreaming of a long lost imperial past (like Russia and Turkey), which aggressively and less covertly are pursuing their strategies, filling gaps left by the western democracies or, more often, exploiting weak points of their policies.

In fact, as described in the EUGS, none of our countries has the strength nor the resources to address these threats and seize the opportunities alone. The European Union with its unparalleled potential is the organization best positioned to face effectively these situations.

In order to deliver on our citizens' expectations and demands we need a stronger European Union, ready to play a greater and more proactive role and take collectively more responsibilities for the common good.

Critical time was lost, giving space to those who described the European Union as a "paper tiger". But it's never too late, and the EU must not miss this opportunity to rise as the actor it claims to be and reinstate its leading position, first in its immediate neighbourhood and then globally.

This has to be done by taking decisive steps by using, together with other tools, the military component as an enabler: in fact, history teaches that when we seek for diplomatic solutions between contenders, we often need to establish a security framework, monitor the situation or enforce a political decision, using military means, allowing dialogue to take place.

Let's take a look at the situation in Libya, for which the European Union can provide short, medium and long term answers, involving all the instruments of power available.

But if we focus on the short term, on what needs to be done now, there are two immediate issues to deal with: the arms embargo and the ceasefire.

As everybody would easily understand, both these immediate actions require an important involvement of military means.

You cannot just declare a ceasefire, or call for an arms embargo and then leave!

You need to remain committed, protecting the conditions and monitoring the implementation.

The launch of this new mission, Operation IRINI, was a great opportunity for the EU to send a strong signal of cohesion to the contenders in Libya, to our partners and to our competitors: in time of crisis, we are capable to speak with a single voice.

Having said that, it is clear that if the EU wants to act now or in the future, confirming itself as a reliable, global security partner, it must possess the political will, the capacity and the capabilities to do so. And this should be our goal.

I must say that within this framework in the last four years, the European Union has done great progress, agreeing on a series of truly innovative security and defence initiatives.

In fact, also on the basis of the outcomes of the Headline Goal Process, which translates the EU's political Level of Ambition into military terms, we launched innovative initiatives like PESCO (Permanent Structured Cooperation), CARD (Coordinated Annual Review on Defence) and the EDF (European Defence Fund). Let me briefly describe them to you.

I will start with PESCO, a framework to create a more integrated cooperation among Member States, by developing and acquiring defence capabilities and making those capabilities easily available for EU military missions and operations. It is a list of 47 projects, like the Eurodrone, the upgrade of Maritime Surveillance and the Joint EU Intelligence School- to mention a few.

Then we have CARD, a useful tool that consists of mapping defence spending and capability planning by Member States, in order to highlight areas at risk of duplication or opportunities for cooperation.

The process has been fully aligned with the NATO Defence Planning Process, in order to improve both mechanisms, providing better visibility

on somehow parallel processes, helping nations coordinating their efforts, benefitting both the Union and the Alliance.

But among the aforementioned initiatives, I must say that the European Defence Fund has attracted the greatest interest, due to the great potential impact on the Europe of Defence it holds.

The EDF is a mechanism designed to provide the means and the financial support in the field of research and development, making cooperation more attractive to participating states. What is more remarkable is that it marks the first time that the Union allocates funds for defence, as the Athena mechanism is very limited and specific in scope.

One of its clear objectives is to contribute to the improvement of European defence cooperation, avoiding waste of resources or duplication of efforts, including from an industrial point of view.

The EDF sets the ground for the EU Defence Industry to retain in Europe the know-how and those critical defence research and development capacities.

It is regrettable and worrisome that the EDF, designed to remedy the fragmentation of the EU defence market, fell an easy victim to the backstage negotiations in the EU corridors and to COVID-19. It experienced an almost 40% cut in its budget, (although not yet final) from the originally planned 13 billion Euros to just 8. At the same time, the military mobility budget drops even more tragically, to 1.5 billion euros (instead of 6.5 billion €).

Now, allow me to introduce the concept of Strategic Autonomy, for which a lot of discussion was made.

In few words, Strategic Autonomy is not the freedom from someone, but the freedom to do something, the capability to be able to act alone, if necessary, or better cooperate with partners.

For this, it needs to have greater autonomous capacity to conduct a wide range of military operations not depending from NATO or the US.

Concerning the relationship between EU and NATO, the last Joint Declarations - confirmed by facts – aim clearly at strengthening such a

cooperation in order to promote peace and stability in the Euro-Atlantic area and to improve the security of our citizens.

This is not a zero-sum game, where putting more resources to develop the security and defence dimension within the EU, means taking them away from NATO, but it is definitely a win-win situation for both Organisations.

In fact, since strengthening the European pillar is also a clear strategic goal for NATO itself and a long-lasting demand by the US, then it is clear that the EU defence initiatives are not undermining NATO, but rather reinforcing it.

In very simple words: what is good for the EU, is good also for NATO.

Military Mobility within and beyond the EU is an excellent example of such complementarity, as both EU and NATO have worked together in the early stages of the process of defining the military requirements, which are at the heart of the contribution provided by the EUMC to allow the Commission to advance its work.

As a quick overlook - as depicted in the slide - let me turn now to the areas where we are currently engaged, starting from the oldest operation, ALTHEA, in Bosnia-Herzegovina.

The operation aims at contributing to a safe and secure environment, providing Capacity-Building and collective training to the local Armed Forces and supporting the overall EU comprehensive strategy for the country.

Then, Operation Atalanta in the Gulf of Aden and the Indian Ocean, which has achieved excellent operational results over the 10 years it exists, protecting World Food Programme transports and other vulnerable shipping from piracy at sea. The operation also offers an important platform for cooperation with Third States including a Capacity Building component in all the operations.

And this is where the EU has found its autonomous space: while NATO is concentrating on Collective Defence, the EU can play a very effective role

in helping countries to walk back on their legs, using all the tools at its disposal.

Of course, this is even more valid for the non-executive activities, EU Military Training Missions, in Mali, Central African Republic and Somalia, which are born to cover the Capacity Building objective, providing training to the local armed forces and advice to the military leadership.

Very important to note is the ongoing review of our training missions, possibly making them more robust, moving - for instance - from a basic training role to a mentoring and accompanying one.

I am referring to the training missions in the Sahel Region, but also in Somalia.

This would not only create more efficient military CSDP activities on the ground, but also create the perception of more influent and effective EU activities in the eyes of the international community, partners and adversaries together.

Additionally, raising our level of ambition for these missions - for which we have also established our own coordinating structure, the Military Planning and Conduct Capability cell - could better mobilize Member States to contribute, providing a solution to the existing shortfalls in personnel.

I have left for last the already mentioned Operation **IRINI in the Mediterranean**. Its core task is the implementation of the UN arms embargo through the use of aerial, maritime and satellite assets. In particular, the mission will be able to carry out inspections of vessels on the high seas off the coast of Libya suspected to be carrying arms or related material to and from Libya in accordance with United Nations Security Council Resolution 2292 (2016).

As secondary tasks, EUNAVFOR MED IRINI will also:

- Monitor and gather information on illicit exports from Libya of petroleum, crude oil and refined petroleum products
- Contribute to the capacity building and training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy in law enforcement tasks at sea

- Contribute to the disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking networks through information gathering and patrolling by planes.

On March 31st 2020, the Council adopted the decision for the launch of OP IRINI.

What do we have since that day?

First of all, for one more time, we have an Operation launched with high expectations but with inadequate resources to deliver on its mandate. Two naval assets (two frigates from France and Greece, plus three aerial assets from Germany, Luxemburg and Poland), expected to patrol 24/7 a vast area of operations. The size of that force is definitely not enough for the accomplishment of the mission.

On May 8th, we had the first torpedo on OP IRINI. Malta vetoed IRINI spending after withdrawing from the EU naval mission. The Maltese government informed the European Council that it would no longer provide boarding team to Operation IRINI, which was attempting to stop Turkish weapons to Libyan GNA.

On June 8th, Ro-Ro CIRKIN, a Tanzania flagged, Turkish owned ship departing from Haydarpassa port in Turkey, suspected to be loaded with heavy military equipment from the Turkish Army, violated the arms-embargo with the support of three Turkish Navy frigates, defying calls from on scene Operation IRINI assets to identify itself and to consent to hailing. The response came from a Turkish frigate that stated that Ro-Ro CIRKIN was “under the protection of the Turkish Republic”. On June 11th, CIRKIN unloaded its unspecified load in Misrata. The Turks later stated that the load was medical supplies for the Libyans.

What does this incident imply about the seriousness and credibility of the European Union as an actor even at its backyard, I leave it up to you.

Before leaving the operational domain, I would like to remind you that the EU is also conducting 11 civilian missions under CSDP. Some are police missions, some are capacity building missions, but they are all deployed in very challenging environments.

The ambition to enhance civil-military synergies is a distinctive feature of the Global Strategy and the EU itself. Better cooperation and coordination between the two completely different, but complementary elements will improve EU's Integrated Approach policy to external crises and conflicts.

The recent, and ongoing COVID-19 pandemic, offered the military an excellent opportunity to remind the public opinion and the people of the EU that it has unlimited potential and that it can be used in multiple other ways than its core task. All over Europe, the Armed Forces set up field hospitals, air lifted hundreds of affected people, provided medical services and transported essential supplies. The pandemic crisis has once more confirmed how relevant, valuable and sometimes irreplaceable is the role of the military tool in emergencies, supporting civilian institutions, across different domains (security, transportation, medical), dealing with the crisis.

And I conclude:

The EUMC is the highest military body within the EU and the only one entitled to provide advice on military matters.

I hope I made clear to you how, in my opinion, the EU, with its Integrated Approach policy and unparalleled potential, could be the real global player for the crises that are affecting our citizens as well as our neighbourhood.

But above all, I want to make clear to all of you my strong view, that we need a stronger Europe. This is what our citizens deserve and this is what the wider world expects. And failing in this gentle and important cause is not an option.

Thank you again, and I stand ready for your questions.

Advanced Modular Training Course

“European Union Defence and Security Issues ”

Thessaloniki, 25 June 2020

General (Ret) Mikhail Kostarakos

Former Chief of the Hellenic National Defence General Staff

Former Chairman of the EU Military Committee




EU Military Committee



The European Union Military Committee

- Highest military body within EU (27 Chiefs of Defence)
- Directs all EU military activities
- Provides military advice and recommendations to the Political and Security Committee


EU Global Strategy



Three Strategic Priorities

- Respond to external crises
- Build the capacities of partners affected by crises and fragility
- **Protect Europe**

Integrated Approach Policy





CSDP initiatives after EU Global Strategy

- Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) → 47 projects
- Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD)
- European Defence Fund (EDF) 2021-2027 **(now €8 billion ?)**
 - ✓ €4.1 billion for collaborative research
 - ✓ €8.9 billion for collaborative capability development
- Military mobility €6.5 billion **(now €1.5 billion?)**
- Strategic Autonomy **(to conduct ops not depending from NATO and the US)**

EU – NATO Relations



EUFOR Operation ALTHEA

Mission data Updated in January 2020

Strength - approximately 600 personnel (partners included)

Beginning of mandate - December 2004 / End of mandate - 5 November 2020 (UNSC Res. 2315 (2016) of 08 November 2016)

MS contributing:

15

Partners contributing:

				
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5



EUFOR

Operation ALTHEA in Bosnia and Herzegovina was launched on 2 December 2004. It is carried out with recourse to NATO assets and capabilities, under the "Berlin +" arrangements.



EU NAVFOR SOMALIA, Operation ATALANTA

Strength - approximately 750 personnel (partners included)

Beginning of mandate - Nov 2008 / End of madate 31 December 2020

MS contributing:



19

Partners contributing:



2




- *Protects vessels of the WFP, AMISOM and other vulnerable shipping.*
- *Deters and disrupts piracy and armed robbery at sea.*
- *Monitors fishing activities off the coast of Somalia.*
- *Supports other EU missions and international organizations*





EUROPEAN UNION CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS 2020



Assistance & Advice
Training
Save lives at sea
Food delivered



EU NAVFOR MED, Operation IRINI

Mission at a Glance



HS SPETSAI



FS JEAN BART

MANDATE AND OBJECTIVES



The **primary task** of the Operation is the **implementation of the arms embargo** imposed by the United Nations Security Council – through UN Security Council Resolution 1970 (2011) and UN Security Council Resolution 2292 (2016). By contributing to stemming the flow of weapons into Libya, the Operation will help create the conditions for a permanent ceasefire in Libya.

As **secondary tasks**, the Operation:

- Contributes to the implementation of UN measures to **prevent the illicit export of petroleum** from Libya through monitoring and surveillance activities, in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2146 (2014) and UN Security Council Resolution 2509 (2020);
- provides capacity **building and training of the Libyan Coast Guard and Navy** in law enforcement tasks at sea;
- contributes to the **disruption of the business model of human smuggling and trafficking** networks in accordance with UN Security Council Resolution 2240 (2015).

FACTS AND FIGURES

OPERATION AREA
Central Mediterranean Sea



OPERATION COMMANDER
Rear Admiral Fabio AGOSTINI (IT)

HEADQUARTERS
Rome, Italy



OPERATION BUDGET
€9.8 million



MANDATE STARTED
31 March 2020



TROOP CONTRIBUTING NATIONS
23*



MANDATE APPROVED UNTIL
31 March 2021



* pending national internal confirmation in certain cases


ACTION

EUNAVFOR MED IRINI draws on maritime, aerial and satellite assets.





EUROPEAN UNION CSDP MISSIONS AND OPERATIONS 2020



Military Missions/Operations
 Civilian Missions



6 ongoing military Missions/Operations



11 ongoing civilian Missions¹



Around **5,000** people currently deployed



Objectives:

Peace-keeping, conflict prevention, strengthening international security, supporting the rule of law, prevention of human trafficking and piracy.

^{*}This Mission is not managed within CSDP structures, but its objectives are very similar to the other Missions, so we include it here

¹Full operational capacity of EUAM RCA is planned for June 2020.

²The Regional Advisory and Coordination Cell is a CSDP action which facilitates EU support to security and defence cooperation amongst G5 Sahel countries (Mauritania, Mali, Burkina-Faso, Niger and Chad).

Conclusions:

- EU Military Committee is the highest military body.
- EU with its Integrated Approach and unparalleled potential could be a real global player.
- We need a stronger EU. This what our citizens deserve and this what the wider world expects.



“European Union Defence and Security Issues ”



QUESTIONS?